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In this paper we discuss the work of Francis Bacon in the context of his declared
aim of giving a “visual shock.” We explore what this means in terms of brain activity
and what insights into the brain’s visual perceptive system his work gives. We do so
especially with reference to the representation of faces and bodies in the human visual
brain. We discuss the evidence that shows that both these categories of stimuli have a
very privileged status in visual perception, compared to the perception of other stimuli,
including man-made artifacts such as houses, chairs, and cars. We show that viewing
stimuli that depart significantly from a normal representation of faces and bodies entails
a significant difference in the pattern of brain activation. We argue that Bacon succeeded
in delivering his “visual shock” because he subverted the normal neural representation of
faces and bodies, without at the same time subverting the representation of man-made
artifacts.
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INTRODUCTION
Neuroesthetics seeks inspiration and insight from works of art
and from debates in the humanities to try to gain some insights,
however small, into the workings of the brain. The present arti-
cle, on the work of the British painter Francis Bacon, is written
in the pursuit of that aim. The article does not delve into the
artistic merits of Bacon’s works, which lies more in the province
of art criticism; it does not discuss the artistic influences that
shaped Bacon’s art, which belongs more properly to art history;
nor does it consider, except in a marginal sense, the influence
of Bacon’s up-bringing and sexual orientation on his art, which
would trespass into psycho-analytic studies. Instead, concentrat-
ing above all on his artistic output as well as on statements about
his work from him and others, we try to ask howwhat his declared
aim, of trying to give “a visual shock,” amounts to in neural
terms and what insights into brain organization the resultant
work gives.
A VISUAL SHOCK
Bacon, whose first US exhibition was described in Time (October
19, 1953) as a “chamber of horrors” filled with paintings that are
“snapshots from hell,” told Melvyn Bragg (1985) on the South
Bank Show that he wanted to give a “shock. . . not a shock that
you could get from the story [but] a visual shock.” He appar-
ently succeeded in doing so, not only when he first began to
produce his work but even today. In the late 1940s, when he
first began to exhibit, a critic wrote in The Observer that Bacon’s
paintings “. . . horrifying though they” are also technically superb,
making one “. . . regret the more that the artist should have been
brought to subjects so esoteric” (quoted in Peppiatt, 1996, p
156), while the correspondent of The Times thought the sub-
ject of his pictures to be “so extremely repellent” as to make his
paintings “as vivid and as meaningless as a nightmare,” lamenting
that Bacon should have used his considerable powers of imag-
ination and pictorial skill to produce something “which it is
impossible not to think worse than nonsense, as Head II, which
appears to be a mutilated corpse, most certainly is” (Peppiatt,
1996, p 156). Nor are such comments restricted to the early
phase of Bacon’s output; they persist until the 1990s, well after
he had acquired world-wide fame. This suggests that the passage
of time did not diminish the intensity of the visual shock that
he intended to produce, either in the average viewer or among
those more knowledgeable about art. The reaction of the aver-
age viewer is perhaps best summed up by Margaret Thatcher
(1992), who described him as “that man who paints those dread-
ful pictures.” This view is not too distant from those expressed in
even more powerful adjectives by more learned critics, Margaret
Walters (Cork, 1985) describing his work as, “daemonic, hys-
terical, monstrous” and Peter Fuller describing him as an “evil
genius” whose images were “odious” (Brighton, 2001). As recently
as 2012 he was described in The Guardian as creating “a mon-
strous, surreal imaginative world of enclosed rooms and private
hells” (Jones, 2012). Such adjectives leave little doubt that he had
succeeded in producing an enduring shock, even in the same
viewer.
The conceptual framework within which Bacon worked is rel-
atively easy to establish and of importance to our argument. It
is significant that, like many other great artists, he destroyed
many of his paintings, claiming that he had usually destroyed
the better ones (Sylvester, 1963). He was always trying, he said,
to paint the one perfect image which, he claimed, he had never
succeeded in achieving. Thus, by his own account, all these paint-
ings were a journey toward the representation, in a single perfect
image that was never achieved, of a concept in his mind. He
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claimed to have had a concept in mind before starting work
on a painting but that, once he started, the painting changed
unpredictably and by accidents, but accidents “out of which
[the artist] chooses the marks which he wants to leave” (Jebb,
1965) (that is, those marks that correspond best to his con-
cept), which for him were “forms that relate to the human image
but are a complete distortion of it” for only then could one get
“to the reality behind the image” (Sylvester, 1963). From those
“accidents” he thus chose what came closest to representing his
concept.
BACON’S OVERALL CONCEPT
What was the overall concept in his mind? It is useful to begin
by making a distinction between inherited and acquired brain
concepts (Zeki, 2008). One of the primordial functions of the
brain is to acquire knowledge, and it does so through inher-
ited and acquired concepts. Faces and bodies are examples of
the former and there is reasonable evidence to suggest that the
recognition of faces and bodies, though not of their identity, is
at least facilitated through inherited concepts that are present
at birth (Zeki, 2008) (see section The Privileged Status of Faces
and Bodies in Visual Perception). Inherited concepts are robust,
stable and do not change with time or do so insignificantly; cru-
cially, they are common to all humans, except in relatively rare
pathological conditions, of which acquired prosopagnosia is espe-
cially noteworthy in this context (see section Prosopagnosia or
Facial Imperception). Certain configurations and relationships
are critical for recognition of faces and bodies as normal ones.
By contrast, acquired concepts to which that of houses, cars and
other human artifacts and situations belong, are malleable and
change with time and acquired experience and are culture depen-
dent. At any given moment, therefore, they are the synthesis of all
previous experiences of the same category of object or situation.
(Zeki, 2008).
Bacon said that he tried to represent “concentrations of real-
ity” (Bragg, 1985). We may surmise from his work that one such
“concentration of reality” (which we equate with acquired con-
cepts) behind the images that he produced was that of alienation,
a situation in which he commonly found himself and apparently
saw in others. The sense of alienation may have been the result of
his own tastes which, during much of his lifetime, were regarded
by Church, state and society as an evil which should carry a
deep sense of guilt. According to Andrew Brighton (2001), Bacon
found inspiration in the writings of Count Joseph de Maistre, an
18th century French philosopher who had emphasized universal
guilt derived from Original Sin and the Fall. Thus, the lonely,
alienated, figures in Bacon’s paintings (and most of his paint-
ings contain single figures, some two, rarely more) were part of
mankind, bearing a guilt common to all even if differing in detail
and traceable to different sources, allowing Bacon to believe that
he was depicting a universal message, that of pain. For Bacon,
“nearly all reality is pain” and he thought that, when we look
at his paintings, we are looking at the real world: “What could
I make,” he asked, “to compete with what goes on every single
day. . . except that I may have tried to make images of it; I have
tried to re-create it and make, not the horror, but. . . images of
realism” (Bragg, 1985).
The means that Bacon employed to project his acquired
concept in his paintings was to subvert the brain’s inherited con-
cepts of what bodies and faces should look like. Thus, in addition
to the lonely figures, he made use of mutilated and savaged faces
and bodies, often in combination. This enabled him, in his own
words, to hit “the nervous system more violently and poignantly”
and thus get to the reality behind the image (Sylvester, 1963). He
was looking, it seems, for something primitive and instantaneous,
divorced as much as possible from the cognitive element and pre-
sumably from cultural context as well, for by concentrating on
deformed faces and bodies he was working outside any social and
cultural context and within one that most, irrespective of race
or culture, would respond to, even if only negatively. Faces and
bodies occupy a very privileged position in visual perception, and
indeed their recognition may be due to inherited brain concepts.
Objects do not share that same privileged position and hence their
distortions would not produce the same visual shock or, if they do,
they become rapidly adapted to, unlike distorted faces and bodies
(Chen and Zeki, 2011). Bacon, on whom Picasso was a lead-
ing influence, thus violated and subverted deliberately the brain
template for registering faces and bodies, leading to an almost
universal experience of his portraits and bodies as disturbing. By
contrast, Picasso’s Cubist work is not as disturbing, partly because
many of his portraits do not disfigure or mutiliate faces or distort
the relationship between their components as violently as Bacon;
disfigurations are minimal and maintain significant parts of the
relationships between components intact, even when presenting,
or attempting to present, different views on the same canvas. The
adjectives describing Bacon’s work, which are peppered through-
out this article, testify that few, if any, have qualified these works
as beautiful, even if they consider them to have considerable artis-
tic merit; almost all find them disturbing. These disfigured and
mutilated faces and bodies are usually set against neutral back-
grounds or anonymous spaces containing few objects—chairs,
tables, light bulbs, cars—which, by contrast, are not in any way
deformed. He seems to have had a marked preference for faces
even in other artists’ work; for example, he preferred the portraits
of both Picasso and Giacometti to their other work (Archimbaud,
1992).
That Bacon should have concentrated almost exclusively on
distorted human bodies and faces to produce an immediate emo-
tional impact on the nervous system, before things got “spelled
out” in the brain (Peppiatt, 1996), invites enquiry into what is
so special about the neural representation of faces and bodies,
which they do not share with other everyday objects. One ques-
tion we therefore address is whether there is any neurological basis
for this violent, primitive and instantaneous assault, an assault
that lies beyond reasoning. It was always Bacon’s intent not to
appeal to reason or even to thinking. The paintings, stripped of
any associations, contained the message and his concept, but oth-
erwise had no story to tell for, as he said, “once an image could
be explained. . . it was worthless,” adding that, “After all, if you
could explain it, why would you go to the trouble of painting
it” (Peppiatt, 1996, p. 117); in his paintings, he was present-
ing, he said, “nothing except what people wanted to read into
it” (Bragg, 1985). The central argument in this essay, which we
develop below, is therefore that Bacon was trying, in his work, to
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project his acquired concept of pain and alienation and horror
by subverting, as far as is possible, the brain’s inherited concepts
of face and body; that, in other words, he was trying to use an
inherited brain concept to project his own acquired concept.
To achieve his overall concept in paintings, that of depict-
ing realism by subverting the brain’s inherited concepts, Bacon
worked from memory and from photographs but frequented
establishments such as the Colony Club in London, where peo-
ple, as he toldMelvyn Bragg (1985), were completely dis-inhibited
and not on their guard, so that he could study them in the raw,
as it were. As well, he was fascinated with movement, especially
as portrayed in Edweard Muybridge’s chronophotography of the
movement of deformed animals as well as in the “Extraordinary
photographs of animals taken out just before they were slaugh-
tered” (Sylvester, 1963). This obsession with deformity and vio-
lence extended to his literary tastes. One of his favorite literary
sources was the Oresteia by Aeschylus. It was, he said, “the most
blood-bathed tragedy that exists, with almost nothing but blood
from beginning to end” and yet, “The reek of human blood smiles
out at me” was a favorite passage of his from the play (Peppiatt,
1996, p 111). The preoccupation with deformity, violence and
violent distortions, indeed with representing violence (for almost
all his paintings suggest that a violence has been done to the sub-
ject) may have been the result of several factors: the violence he
received from his father, to whom he was sexually attracted, the
“neurosis” of the century in which he lived and his experiences
as an orderly during the Second World War, his own taste for
violence even in sex, which he considered to be a violent act.
Whatever the cause, he was partial to portraying the human con-
dition by representing violence, for he considered the whole of
life—from birth to death—to be violent.
We first address the question of whether faces and bodies
occupy a privileged position in visual perception because of
inherited brain concepts regulating their recognition, one not
shared by objects and, next, whether distortion of faces and bod-
ies influences the neural response more than distortion of objects
and man-made artifacts. The relevance of discussing this in the
context of this article is our belief that inherited brain concepts,
such as configurations that qualify a stimulus as a face or body, are
much more susceptible to the effects of distortion than acquired
ones, to which houses, cars and man-made objects in general
belong (Zeki, 2008; Chen and Zeki, 2011), and that Bacon con-
sistently achieved his effects by distorting inherited brain concepts
of face and body and sparing the objects, which are more resistant
to distortion.
FACES AND BODIES
Faces in general occupy a very privileged position in visual
perception, as do bodies. This is not surprising, given their
importance in obtaining knowledge about an individual, their
emotional status at any given moment and their identity. The
literature on the topic of face perception is now quite volumi-
nous, and the one on body perception tending in that direction.
We do not provide an exhaustive review here but distil from it
those points that are especially relevant for discussing Bacon’s
“visual shock” and its enduring effect, in terms of that privileged
position.
FIGURE 1 | (A) shows some of the classical visual areas on a surface
drawing of the brain, while (B) shows the areas that are critical for face and
body recognition. The position of these areas is approximate.
THE PRIVILEGED STATUS OF FACES AND BODIES IN VISUAL
PERCEPTION
Reflecting their significance for acquiring knowledge, special
areas of the brain appear to be critical for the recognition of faces
and bodies, although whether these areas are uniquely special-
ized for faces or bodies has been debated (Haxby et al., 2001)
as has the question of whether there is an inherited neural tem-
plate for facial recognition, some considering that it is more a
matter of expertise derived from intimate contact and experience
(Gauthier and Nelson, 2001; Bilalic et al., 2011). Whichever view
turns out to be correct, there is common agreement that the areas
enumerated below are strongly activated by faces. Among these
are (i) an area located in the fusiform gyrus and known as the
fusiform face area (FFA) (Sergent et al., 1992; Kanwisher et al.,
1997; Kanwisher and Yovel, 2006) (Figure 1B), damage to which
leads to the syndrome of prosopagnosia or an incapacity to recog-
nize familiar faces (Damasio et al., 1982, for a review). We note
in passing that the FFA is also activated by faces viewed from
different angles (e.g., Pourtois et al., 2005) and by animal faces
(Maguire et al., 2001), both common in Bacon’s work. (ii) an
area located in the inferior lateral occipital gyrus and known as
the occipital face area (OFA) (Peelen and Downing, 2007; Pitcher
et al., 2011) and (iii) a third area, located in the superior temporal
sulcus, which appears to be involved in the recognition of chang-
ing facial features and expressions (Haxby et al., 2000; Kanwisher
and Yovel, 2006), thus emphasizing the importance of the face as
a means of obtaining knowledge about a person’s emotional sta-
tus. These areas respond better to faces and give weaker or no
responses when the faces are scrambled so as to contain all the
elements but arranged in a way that is different and does not lead
to recognition of a face (Kanwisher et al., 1997). This in itself, at
a very elementary level, implies that there must be certain con-
figurations of a stimulus if it is to lead to activity in areas critical
for the recognition of faces. The privileged status of face percep-
tion is further emphasized by the very rapid activation of OFA, at
60–100ms after stimulus onset (Pitcher et al., 2007).
That there is a privileged mechanism that favors the early
recognition of faces and bodies is further supported by evidence
which shows that the face and body recognition systems are not
only very robust but also very exigent in their demands for activa-
tion. For example, the negative EEG potential at 170ms (which
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refers to a negative deflection, N170, of occipito-temporal ori-
gin, occurring at about 170ms after presentation of the stimulus,
and is larger in amplitude to faces and bodies than to objects)
is demanding as to the correct configuration of the face since
mis-aligning the two halves of a face delays and increases it specif-
ically for upright faces, much less so for inverted ones (Ishizu
et al., 2008). Here it is interesting to note that many, if not most,
of Bacon’s portraits can arguably be said to be misaligned in
one way or another (see Figure 2). One may surmise from this
that a stimulus such as that of Figure 2 would equally delay and
increase the 170ms deflection, in other words signal an abnor-
mal configuration by leading to a modified pattern of neural
responses.
The N170 component is also enhanced and delayed when the
stimuli are those of inverted bodies (Stekelenburg and de Gelder,
2004; Minnebusch et al., 2008), thus suggesting an interaction
between separate representation of faces and bodies, since images
of human bodies themselves elicit a negative peak at 190ms which
differs in spatial distribution (Thierry et al., 2006; Ishizu et al.,
2010); how a mutilated head sitting on a mutilated body, as is
common in Bacon’s work, would affect neural responses is not
known, the effects of distortion having been studied in rela-
tion to a face or a body but not the two together. All of this
speaks in favor of an essential configuration for faces, which may
be due to an inherited or rapidly acquired template for facial
recognition.
That even severe distortion of faces (and bodies) such as Bacon
regularly practiced has little effect, beyond a delay, on the recog-
nition of a stimulus as a face or a body testifies to the robustness
of the representation, even if distorted faces result in a pattern
FIGURE 2 | Francis Bacon—Self Portrait, 1969, an example of a
mis-aligned face. © The Estate of Francis Bacon. All rights reserved. DACS
2013.
of activity in the brain that is different from that obtained with
neutral faces (see section A Fast Route for the Recognition of
Facial and Body Stimuli). Hence the face recognition system is
robust on the one hand and susceptible to disfiguration on the
other, since disfiguration leads to a different pattern of neuronal
activity.
The brain also appears to devote special cortical areas to the
representation of human bodies, even headless ones (Schwarzlose
et al., 2005). One of these is the fusiform body area (FBA),
located in the fusiform gyrus in close proximity to the FFA,
and the other is the extrastriate body area (EBA) located in the
infero-posterior part of the temporal cortex, neighboring area
OFA (Peelen and Downing, 2007 for a review) (see Figure 1B).
Hence, there is also an essential configuration that is critical for
eliciting activity from these specialized areas. But here again,
Bacon, though maintaining the relationship between the con-
stituents that constitute a body, distorted them severely and
added a subversive emotional envelope (see section The Effect
of Distortions of Face and Body on Cortical Activity). The areas
critical for body recognition lie in close proximity to those
for facial recognition (the OFA and the FFA); the brain thus
appears to devote separate systems to the recognition of bod-
ies and of faces but ones that are intimately connected since
exposure of subjects to pictures of fearful body expressions acti-
vates the FFA (Hadjikhani and de Gelder, 2003), implying an
intimate anatomical and functional connection between them.
We note in passing that, his portraits apart, Bacon commonly
disfigured both faces and bodies in single compositions (see
Figure 3).
The areas enumerated here may not be the only ones that
are important in the recognition of faces and bodies, and their
emotional status; some have argued that the recognition of faces
engages a much more distributed system (Ishai et al., 2005), but
there is common agreement that they are critically important.
Hence, viewing of Bacon’s portraits is strongly dependent upon
the functioning of these areas, an interesting if by now obvious
fact. It has, however, also been argued that, even within the region
of the fusiform gyrus occupied by the FFA, cells responsive to
common objects may be found (Haxby et al., 2001). This is inter-
esting, both in the context of Bacon’s work and in relation to
the neurobiology of visual representation in the brain. Given the
resistance of objects, and the susceptibility of faces and bodies, to
inversion and to distortion (see below), it becomes interesting to
enquire whether cells representing faces and bodies on the one
hand and objects on the other, are regulated differently, even if
they co-occur in the same area(s) and whether it is because of this
differential susceptibility that Bacon concentrated on deforming
faces and bodies and sparing objects.
PROSOPAGNOSIA OR FACIAL IMPERCEPTION
Prosopagnosia or an incapacity to recognize an individ-
ual through the face, and especially inherited prosopagnosia
(McConachie, 1976; Ariel and Sadeh, 1996), also supports the
view that there is an inherited or a rapidly acquired template for
face representation that is not shared by objects. When acquired,
the syndrome is usually the result of damage to the fusiform gyrus
that includes the FFA. Prosopagnosia may result in an incapacity
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FIGURE 3 | Francis Bacon—Portrait of Henrietta Moraes on a Blue
Couch, 1965, an example of disfigured face and body. © The Estate of
Francis Bacon. All rights reserved. DACS 2013.
limited to the recognition of familiar faces but there have been
examples of patients simply not able to recognize faces. The
imperceptions may extend to an inability, or impaired ability, to
recognize the faces of animals (Assal et al., 1984), which have a
basic significant facial configuration not unlike humans, and we
note here that Bacon depicted both human and animal faces and
bodies, sometimes in combination. Not even knowledge that a
prosopagnosic patient is actually looking at a face (for example at
his own in a mirror) can restore the normal perception of a face
(Pallis, 1955).
For our purposes here, we may summarize this section by say-
ing that, regardless of disagreements over important details, there
is now general agreement that the face and body recognition sys-
tems are neurologically robust and that several cortical areas are
critical for their recognition. The relevance of a robust system is
that its properties are much less plastic and therefore much less
modifiable with experience, a point that seems to us of impor-
tance in understanding how Bacon was able to produce a visual
shock.
FORM REPRESENTATION IN THE BRAIN
The form system in the brain is commonly thought to be derived
from the orientation selective cells of V1 (Hubel and Wiesel,
1977) (Figure 1A) and consists of a single hierarchical pathway
which uses the orientation selective cells to build up more com-
plex forms, and eventually complex objects that an area such as
the lateral occipital complex (LOC) responds to (Grill-Spector
et al., 2001). This view is almost certainly far too simplistic and
there is evidence that the form system itself may consist of paral-
lel sub-systems. We do not review this here but point to clinical
evidence which shows that (a) agnosias for complex shapes and
objects need not be accompanied by an agnosia for simple line
representation of the same shapes (Humphreys and Riddoch,
1987) and, conversely, that agnosia for simple line drawings of
complex shapes need not be accompanied by an agnosia for
the complex shapes themselves (Hiraoka et al., 2009) and (b)
that an agnosia for static forms does not extend to the same
forms when in motion (Botez and Sebrãnescu, 1967), consistent
with the suggestion that there may be a separate dynamic form
system in the brain (Grossberg, 1991; Zeki, 1993). Our inter-
est in mentioning the brain areas critical for form is (a) that
regardless of whether the brain areas critical for face perception
also respond to objects, other, distinct, cortical areas have been
reported to be involved in object representation and, so far, these
have not been implicated in face or body perception; (b) that
the areas critical for face recognition should also be responsive to
objects complicates the picture somewhat on the one hand while
emphasizing a critical feature on the other, namely that the brain
reaction to distorted faces and bodies is different from its reac-
tion to distorted objects (see section Consequences of Violating
the Essential Configuration of Faces).
INHERITED TEMPLATES FOR FACIAL AND BODY RECOGNITION
Evidence that we are born with a capacity to recognize and reg-
ister essential configurations that qualify stimuli as a face are
present at birth or very soon (within hours) thereafter is shown
by the fact that children react very early on—within a matter of
hours—to faces, in that they orient more readily toward simple
face-like patterns (Goren et al., 1975; Johnson et al., 1991). But
what exactly they are reacting to is not universally agreed on. One
view is that we are born with some kind of inherited “template”
that approximates a face and another is that it has more to do with
asymmetries in what appears in the upper and lower field of view,
the reasoning being that new-borns prefer patterns in whichmore
elements appear in the upper field of view (eyes) than in the lower
(mouth) (Simion et al., 2002; Cassia et al., 2008). A third view
may be that the intimate contact between infant and parent priv-
ileges the face through a rapid plastic process that facilitates the
recognition of faces (Johnson, 2005). These arguments, though
of substantial interest in the context of the neural determinants
of facial perception, are of little interest for our present purposes
because, whichever of the hypotheses turns out to be valid, the
net result, perceptually, is that new-borns orient preferentially
to faces or face-like stimuli, thus suggesting that there is some-
thing robust, or becomes rapidly robust, about configurations
that are face-like. Whether due to an inherited concept (Zeki,
2008) for faces or face-like configurations or a privileged plasticity
that favors the recognition of face-like stimuli, it is clear that there
is a very early recognition of, and preference for, face-like stimuli.
Hence, Bacon was subverting something very privileged in visual
perception.
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The perception of bodies has not been studied as extensively,
but there are reasons to suppose that there are also essential
configurations that qualify stimuli as being that of bodies. The
evidence comes principally from electroencephalographic (EEG)
recordings from the brains of 3–4 month old infants, who appear
to be able to recognize bodies (de Gelder, 2006).
By contrast, there is no similar essential configuration to qual-
ify an object, and where there is one through exposure and
training, it can adapt rapidly to a new configuration that is rad-
ically different. One need only refer to the example of planes,
from simple twin-engined turboprop planes, to drones, to jumbo
jets, to variable swing-wing aircraft, to realize that there are many
configurations that can fit the (acquired) concept of a plane (for
before there were planes there was no acquired concept of them).
Nor does there appear to be a distinct and privileged mechanism
for early and rapid acquisition of a template for objects. Here
it is interesting to note that, even in adult life, monkeys can be
trained to learn new configurations of objects and discriminate
them as a category even if they had not seen the particular exam-
ple before (Logothetis et al., 1995). Whether rapidly acquired
through a privileged plasticity or not, the templates for faces and
bodies are not modifiable, in the sense that those for objects can
be modified (see section Consequences of Violating the Essential
Configuration of Faces).
THE HOLISTIC REPRESENTATION OF FACE AND BODY
While painting disfigured and mutilated bodies and faces, Bacon
nevertheless maintained a generally holistic representation that
makes it easy to discriminate his paintings as being of faces
or bodies. It is commonly accepted that face representation
is holistic. Evidence for this comes partly from studies of the
so-called “inversion effect,” by which is meant the relative dif-
ficulty of recognizing faces when they are inverted, although
Bacon himself rarely painted inverted faces and bodies, Figure 4
being a somewhat rare exception and Figure 5 (Reclining Woman,
1961) a more extreme version, in the total inversion and dis-
figuration of the human face and body. The inversion effect
has been proposed as demonstrating the importance of con-
figural, relational, information in facial recognition. It is not
actually limited to faces, since objects in general become more
difficult to recognize when inverted (Haxby et al., 1999); but
inversion has a disproportionately large effect on facial recog-
nition compared to the recognition of objects (de Gelder and
Rouw, 2000). Many prosopagnosia studies also attest to the fact
that the deficit is holistic, in the sense that it leads to an inca-
pacity to recognize a face while sparing the ability to recognize
its constituents, such as the eyes or the nose (Kimchi et al.,
2012), that the whole is other than the sum of the parts, in
Gestalt language. It is, in short, the relationship of the constituent
parts that is critical, and constitutes the essential configura-
tion. It is interesting to note here that a patient suffering from
object agnosia but not prosopagnosia was capable of perceiving a
face made up of objects (the Arcimboldo Effect), without being
able to recognize what the constituent objects were (Moscovitch
et al., 1997), implying that a given essential configuration or
arrangement, no matter what the constituents that make up
that configuration might be and no matter how distorted the
FIGURE 4 | Francis Bacon—Triptych—Studies of the Human Body 1979
(detail of center panel). © The Estate of Francis Bacon. All rights
reserved. DACS 2013.
constituents are, provided they bear the essential relationship to
one another to constitute a face, are sufficient to qualify a face
as a face.
The neural consequences of inversion are controversial, in
line with the controversy as to whether there are “face mod-
ules” in the brain or whether there are extended brain regions
in which objects are represented, of which faces constitute one
category. There is general agreement that face inversion dimin-
ishes the response to faces in the FFA and the temporal face
regions, and has a selective and dramatic effect on the responses
to faces in regions which are responsive to houses (Haxby et al.,
2000). This raises an interesting question: if knowledge of faces
and objects are both acquired through expertise, as has been
argued (Gauthier and Nelson, 2001 for a review), the larger per-
ceptual susceptibility of faces and bodies to inversion implies
that different mechanisms are at work, or perhaps that the neu-
ral mechanisms underlying one kind of representation are more
labile than those underlying the other. Bacon appears to have
opted instinctively for the less labile representation to deliver his
visual shock.
Inversion of faces, as of bodies, also results in slower reac-
tion times and higher error rates for identification (Reed et al.,
2003) and it is inversion of the whole rather than of compo-
nents that produces these results (see also the “Thatcher Illusion,”
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FIGURE 5 | Francis Bacon—Reclining Woman, 1961. © The Estate of
Francis Bacon. All rights reserved. DACS 2013.
Thompson, 1980). Indeed, even distorted faces (ones in which
the eyes are positioned asymmetrically) are processed holistically
(de Heering et al., 2012). Crucially, inverted faces lead to a pat-
tern of cortical activation that is distinct from that produced by
upright faces and resembles more closely the activation pattern
produced by viewing objects (Haxby et al., 1999), as if an inverted
face becomes coded as yet another object. This implies again a
difference in the neural mechanisms regulating the representation
of the two. Inversion has a disproportionately large effect on the
recognition of body postures (Reed et al., 2003). Distorted bod-
ies also have a significant effect on brain-evoked potentials (Gliga
and Dehaene-Lambertz, 2005), suggesting that the perception of
bodies may also be facilitated by some inherited neural template,
which may however also be facilitated through expertise.
Themutilation and disfiguration of faces and bodies in Bacon’s
work is largely restricted to the constituents but does not affect
the relationship of these constituents to one another, hence main-
taining their holistic aspect and allowing them to be recognized
easily as faces or bodies. Only rarely is the relationship of the
constituents altered, as in his Self Portrait (Figure 6), which vio-
lates somewhat the norms of a face in the absence of one eye,
and the depiction of a severely distorted jaw with an abnormal
relationship to mouth and nose. Otherwise, his distortions are of
FIGURE 6 | Francis Bacon—Self Portrait, 1973. © The Estate of Francis
Bacon. All rights reserved. DACS 2013.
constituents which, though bearing a correct relationship to one
another, may be unequal in size or severely asymmetric. The por-
trait in Figure 7 has an essential configuration that is recognizable
instantly as a face, but it is a highly abnormal one, with one side
being out of proportion with the other. Hence, in terms of our
definition given above, the pictures contain not only the essential
configuration necessary to result in activity—though apparently
an abnormal one—in the areas critical for face perception, but
in addition arouse strong negative emotions and also almost cer-
tainly entail activity in the amygdala and insula (see below section
A Fast Route for the Recognition of Facial and Body Stimuli).
THE EFFECT OF DISTORTIONS OF FACE AND BODY ON
CORTICAL ACTIVITY
The distortion of faces and bodies is more severe in some of
Bacon’s paintings than in others but very few can be said to render
faces and bodies normally. Distortions in general, even those that
are much less severe than the ones crafted by Bacon, lead to a pat-
tern of cortical activity that is somewhat different from the one
produced when humans view normal faces and bodies, although
it should be emphasized that images of “distorted” bodies and
faces used in the experiments described below were nowhere as
extreme or as distorted as the ones depicted by Bacon in his paint-
ings. In particular, the amplitudes of the responses evoked by
viewing faces and bodies are reduced by viewing distorted ver-
sions of both (Gliga and Dehaene-Lambertz, 2005). It is, again,
noteworthy that object inversion and distortion, which Bacon
generally avoided, does not produce similar results (Boutsen et al.,
2006).
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FIGURE 7 | Francis Bacon—Head III, 1961. © The Estate of Francis Bacon.
All rights reserved. DACS 2013.
One of themost famous portraits of Bacon is inspired by Diego
Velazquez’s painting of Pope Innocent X, a painting which Bacon
never really saw but worked from photographs of it alone. Bacon
may have wanted to depict the human cage in which even some-
one so special, as he said, as the Pope is confined but the Pope is
not the only figure to be so confined in Bacon’s similar drawings.
It has been suggested that the paintings are a reaction to his rela-
tionship with his father and that they were influenced by a scene
from Eisenstein film Battleship Potemkin or by Nicholas Poussin’s
TheMassacre of the Innocents, where amother is crying in agony at
the murder of her child, or perhaps both. Whatever their psycho-
logical and artistic origin, the Pope drawings nevertheless show an
unaccustomed picture, of someone screaming, even if the face of
the Pope is not as mangled as those in many of his other portraits.
In Head VI (Figure 8), barely half the face of a screaming pope
is visible, suggesting a profound abnormality characteristic of his
other depictions of popes and cardinals. They thus also constitute
a departure from a sort of distortion of what qualifies a face as a
face. On the rare occasions when he portrayed, in similar condi-
tions, a much more normally appearing face [Figure 9 (Study for
Portrait II, 1952)], the impact is much less severe and the painting
correspondingly much less arresting.
The list of distortions is hardly worth describing in detail;
about the only general but accurate statement that can be made
of all his paintings is that they are agonized, mutilated and sav-
aged portraits. Cecil Beaton, the English photographer, recounts
in his autobiography his shock at seeing Bacon’s portrait of him-
self where, “The face was hardly recognizable as a face for it was
disintegrating before your eyes, suffering from a severe case of
elephantiasis; a swollen mass of raw meat and fatty tissues. The
FIGURE 8 | Francis Bacon—Head VI, 1949. © The Estate of Francis
Bacon. All rights reserved. DACS 2013.
nose spreads in many directions like a polyp but sagged finally
over one cheek. The mouth looked like a painful boil about to
burst. . . ” (Peppiatt, 1996, p 226). Bacon himself preferred to work
from photographs rather than have models in his studio, espe-
cially in his later years, “to avoid, as he said, inflicting on them in
their presence the injury which he did to them in paint” (Peppiatt,
1996, p 204). Indeed, it is said that when Lucien Freud came to
Bacon’s studio to pose for a portrait, he found that it was almost
finished, with Bacon insisting that he only needed to work on the
feet!
It is interesting to note here that human-animal complexes—as
in Egyptian art and in particular the sphinx—which Bacon greatly
admired and which could be regarded as “distorted” representa-
tions of both humans and animals, are not nearly as unsettling
or disturbing as the disfigured paintings of Bacon, either those of
faces alone, or those of bodies, or of the two together. We suppose
that this is because, although the two are combined in a depar-
ture from what humans usually experience, nevertheless the two
neurally separately represented entities—bodies and faces—are
normal and neither would constitute an “assault” on the nervous
system. By contrast, when Bacon used the sphinx as a template
for his paintings, both the body and the face were distorted (see
Francis Bacon, Oedipus and the Sphinx after Ingres).
No less deformed in Bacon’s paintings are the bodies; indeed
few of his paintings, if any, can be said to escape that savage disfig-
urement. There is no particular part of the body that is privileged
in this regard but what is interesting is that, even when a segment,
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FIGURE 9 | Francis Bacon-–Study for Portrait II, 1953. © The Estate of
Francis Bacon. All rights reserved. DACS 2013.
for example the torso or the legs, is spared, the general impression
gained by the viewer is a total disfigurement, suggesting a holistic
representation of the body. His Study for a Portrait (1971) is a typ-
ical example of a mangled body, which has one or two “normal”
features, in this case the foot, which nevertheless is in a somewhat
abnormal position. Study from the Human Body: Man Turning on
the Light (Reynolds, 2007) (Figure 10) has a more or less nor-
mal appearance in one half and a much distorted one in the other
which, if bodies are processed configurally, would amount to dis-
tortion. Such examples may be multiplied, but it is interesting
to note that, especially with his depictions of the human body,
the ordinary objects incorporated into the paintings are virtually
always undistorted.
The perceptual classification of a face or body as happy or
threatening or sad or fearful also depends upon given specific
configurations. It is common knowledge that upturned cor-
ners of the mouth are one element signifying a happy face
while downturned ones signify the opposite. Here, another
innovation in Bacon’s works intrudes—his faces are neither
happy nor sad, neither threatening nor comforting, neither fear-
ful nor welcoming. Instead, they are all mutilated and usu-
ally savagely so; they are, in Peppiatt’s words, “unusual” and
“sinisterly unpleasant.” Hence, what Bacon has achieved is to
trample over such configurations that allow the rapid classifi-
cation of the emotional envelope on a face or a body into the
above categories.
FIGURE 10 | Francis Bacon—Study from the Human Body: Man Turning
On the Light, 1973. © The Estate of Francis Bacon. All rights reserved.
DACS 2013.
A FAST ROUTE FOR THE RECOGNITION OF FACIAL AND BODY STIMULI
In his book, Peppiatt states that Bacon’s intent was to produce
work such “that the nerves are immediately alerted to something
unusual, something sinisterly unpleasant, before the image has
spelled itself out in the brain” (Peppiatt, 1996). Most of his paint-
ings alert one to something unusual, even his relatively normal
ones of the Screaming Pope. There is evidence that the emotion-
ally disturbing rendering of faces and bodies engages a fast neural
system, but whether this occurs before the image has “spelled
itself out in the brain” is not certain. It is to be noted that objects
can also be distorted but do not have nearly the same emotional
impact as distorted faces and bodies and, moreover, that Bacon
himself rarely distorted objects and when he did so, it was very
mild and produces no emotional impact at all.
When the faces viewed have a “sinister” and therefore strong
emotional component (both common in Bacon’s paintings), there
is activation of the amygdala (Morris et al., 1996; Hadjikhani
and de Gelder, 2003; Sato et al., 2011) as well as of the insula
(Krolak-Salmon et al., 2003), although neither has been shown to
be engaged when neutral faces are viewed. It has been suggested
that viewing a fearful face leads to fast, short-latency activation
(at about 100ms after exposure) of the amygdala before spreading
to the cortex (Krolak-Salmon et al., 2004). More recent evidence
shows that the latency of response from the sub-cortical centers
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involved is not very different from latencies in areas such as the
OFA when subjects view neutral faces. Fearful faces activate the
amygdala rapidly (in the 50–150ms time frame), while a tran-
scranial magnetic stimulation study suggests the earliest activity
in the OFA occurs at 60–100ms for neutral faces (Pitcher et al.,
2007), with a later component at 150ms (Hung et al., 2010).
The facial recognition route which registers rapidly extreme
expressions on a face or a body such as fear or disgust, is more
“primitive” in the sense that it is activated by low spatial fre-
quencies (coarse visual information) and is independent of the
precise identity of the person viewed (Vuilleumier et al., 2003;
Maratos et al., 2009). The sub-cortical routes seemingly influence
strongly face perception but can act autonomously, since subjects
can recognize the valence on a face when faces are viewed with-
out conscious awareness of the face itself (de Gelder et al., 2005),
even if the sub-cortical route relays signals to the corresponding
cortical zones and modulates activity in them (Johnson, 2005).
This suggests that the emotional component—fear, disgust, (as
is so common when viewing Bacon’s paintings)-is recorded as
rapidly as the face itself. Hence, the sub-cortical system may be
instrumental in alerting the brain, with very brief latencies, that a
stimulus recognized as a face has something unusual about it.
It is likely that the sub-cortical system is used in the demon-
strated newborn preference for faces (Johnson, 2005). This route
may in fact not only modulate cortical responses but also be
indicative of a system involved with facial recognition that acts
in parallel with the high frequency system, which identifies details
on the face as well as facial identity. Thus, while the recognition of
a stimulus as containing the “primitives” of a face might depend
upon a sub-cortical system and on low spatial frequencies, the
process appears to becomemore “corticalized” as refinements due
to experience are added and recognition is not only of a face as
such but the identity of the face (Johnson, 2005).
To our knowledge no parallel studies have been performed to
learn whether there is a sub-cortical or cortical system that reacts
to bodies presented in low spatial frequencies. Nor has any fast,
sub-cortical route for object recognition been reported.
UNCONSCIOUS EMOTIONAL IMPACT OF DISFIGURED BODIES AND
FACES
Bacon often emphasized that his work came from the “uncon-
scious.” “I’ve made images that the intellect can never make,” he
told Melvyn Bragg emphatically (Bacon, interviewed by Bragg,
1985). He also often stated that he produced some of his most
prized works, such as Three Figures at the Base of a Crucifixion
(1944) (Tate, 2013a) [of which there is also a second version (Tate,
2013b)], when in an inebriated state and not capable of clear
thinking, thus perhaps emphasizing the predominance of what
he supposed is the “unconscious” element. Bacon reputedly was
inspired by a number of sources for this painting, including Greek
mythology as well as the work of Pablo Picasso. Taken together
with his avowed aim of attacking the nervous system before things
get spelled out in the brain, he is perhaps emphasizing that his
paintings are originating from the “unconscious” and are des-
tined for the “unconscious.” Of course, what Bacon means by the
“unconscious” is never spelled out clearly or defined. The mean-
ing we would like to attach to it is more specific; we mean by
it a severe mutilation and distortion of what constitutes a nor-
mal face that is registered in the brain even when the subject is
not consciously aware of having viewed such a face. Violations
of essential configurations are experienced consciously and have,
as a consequence, an emotional dimension that is also experi-
enced consciously. But there appears to be also an unconscious
dimension that mediates the experience; subjects can discrimi-
nate the emotional valence on a face even when not consciously
aware of the face, especially if the expression is fearful (Bertini
et al., 2013). Here it is important to notice, once again, that
the “fearful” faces used in such experiments are not nearly as
unusual as those depicted by Bacon. The rapid activation of amyg-
dala and insula by emotional stimuli which can be registered
“unconsciously,” implies that, for the ordinary viewer, a Bacon
painting is registered through the two parallel systems, cortical
and sub-cortical, with a dominant sub-cortical emotional regis-
tration occurring through structures such as the amygdala and
insula. It is hard to escape the conclusion that the sub-cortical sys-
tem is the emotionally more dominant one, since it is capable of
responding even in the absence of an acknowledged “awareness”
of the stimulus. The adjectives used to describe Bacon’s work—
“repellent,” “mutilated,” “hell”–serve to describe well the strong
emotional component in his work, a component which seem-
ingly would activate the emotional branch of the face-recognition
system powerfully. Disregarding the religious connotation in the
title of Three Studies for Figures at the Base of a Crucifixion, it
is evidently a painting of some horrifically deformed animal(s),
so deformed that it is hard to tell the species or indeed whether
it is an animal at all. Yet, we emphasize again, there is nothing
extraordinary about the geometric configurations against which
the animals are set. Especially in the second version of the Three
Studies, the geometric lines are normal and the tables are eas-
ily recognizable as tables though the central one could easily be
conceived of as the somewhat bizarre creation of a modern artist.
It is to be noted, however, that the emotional valence on some
of his portraits or bodies are hard to classify as fearful or shock-
ing or threatening; they are departures even from the norms that
we associate with such emotions. How, for example, is one to
categorize, in terms of emotions, the triptych portrait of Isabel
Rawsthorne, whom Bacon considered to be “a very beautiful
woman” (Bragg, 1985), shown in Figure 11? Severely mutilated
may be a more appropriate term, especially for the central por-
trait; what is not in doubt is that all three represent significant
departures from normal faces and normal emotions, be they emo-
tions of fear or happiness. To that extent they are subversions of
the brain’s normal, expected, experience of faces and hence con-
stitute and represent a threat. It would be interesting to learn how
such distortions, which can be qualified only as unusual but not
necessarily as ugly or threatening, affect the pattern of activity in
both the cortical and sub-cortical systems that are important for
facial recognition.
HUMAN ARTEFACTS IN BACON’S PAINTINGS
We have alluded repeatedly above to the difference in Bacon’s
paintings between faces and bodies on the one hand and objects
on the other, the former being severely distorted and mutilated
while the latter escaped such violence from one who thought that
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FIGURE 11 | Francis Bacon—Three Studies of Isabel Rawsthorne, 1965. © The Estate of Francis Bacon. All rights reserved. DACS 2013.
FIGURE 12 | Francis Bacon—Triptych August 1972 (right hand panel). ©
The Estate of Francis Bacon. All rights reserved. DACS 2013.
the whole of life is violent. We give a few more examples below, to
emphasize the point: The chair on which theman of Figure 12 sits
is fairly normal as is the window or door behind. Equally, there is
nothing unusual in the lines that constitute a sort of cage in which
the person portrayed in Figure 14 sits. Bacon claimed that he used
these lines only as a kind of frame for what he was painting. In
Figure 13, the cage could be in a bi-stable state and somewhat
FIGURE 13 | Francis Bacon—Sphinx—Portrait of Muriel Belcher, 1979.
© The Estate of Francis Bacon. All rights reserved. DACS 2013.
unusual in shape but other than that there is nothing about it that
is shocking, even in spite of its somewhat unusual shape. Equally,
the furnishings of Figure 14 are all fairly normal, while the face of
the sitter is severely deformed. Such examples may be multiplied
and attest to one difference between his rendering of bodies and
faces on the one hand and objects on the other: he deformed and
mutilated the former but left the latter largely intact.
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FIGURE 14 | Francis Bacon—Seated Figure, 1961. © The Estate of
Francis Bacon. All rights reserved. DACS 2013.
CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLATING THE ESSENTIAL
CONFIGURATION OF FACES
Superficially, any unusual visual input may be considered to be
a visual shock but most of these are momentary and quickly
adapted to. A very unusual artifact, one which departs from the
general class of artifacts to which it belongs (say of planes or
cars), may at first sight constitute a visual shock in the sense that
it is an unaccustomed departure from the norm. With repeated
viewing and time, however, it ceases to be a shock but comes
to be accepted as commonplace; but this does not seem to be
true of visual stimuli for which we have an ingrained or possibly
inherited predisposition (Chen and Zeki, 2011).
In further evidence of the robustness of the neural templates—
whether inherited or rapidly acquired after birth—for essential
configurations that qualify a visual stimulus as a face, are exper-
iments inspired by Bacon’s work, which have aimed to chart the
differences that underlie the perception of violated faces and vio-
lated human artifacts such as cars or planes. Violated faces, unlike
normal faces and violated human artifacts, result in activation of
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and parietal cortex. This
activation is resistant to prolonged viewing of violated faces (up
to one month), in that viewing abnormal faces for that period
does not decrease activity in that cortex but actually enhances it.
This is interesting because the DLPFC gives a strong reaction to
unpredictable stimuli or to departures from what is considered
normal. For example, although the DLPFC does not appear to be
active when objects are dressed in colors with which they are nor-
mally associated, it is active when humans view objects dressed
in un-natural colors, that is to say colors with which they are not
usually associated (Zeki and Marini, 1998). The strength of activ-
ity in the DLPFC appears to decrease with prolonged exposure
to such unpredictable stimuli (Raichle et al., 1994; Rainer and
Miller, 2000; Fletcher et al., 2001). That the activity in the DLPFC
should have increased when viewing violated faces even after pro-
longed exposure to such stimuli implies (a) that we do not adapt
easily to the concept of violated faces and (b) that the significant
configuration that qualifies a stimulus as a face is much more
robust than the configurations that characterize the recognition
of artifacts acquired through experience, and hence any depar-
tures from it are strongly registered. It is interesting to note in
passing that violation of spatial relations (which Bacon did not
indulge in) are also resistant to adaptation over a similar period
(Chen and Zeki, 2011).
Whether the brain has specialized “face modules” or whether
faces constitute one category processed in a large cortical zone
which also processes other categories, that violation of faces
should lead to strong and enduring activity within parietal cor-
tex and the DLPFC while violations of human artifacts should
not, leads naturally to the supposition that the neural mecha-
nisms regulating the two categories (and probably bodies as well)
differ significantly, although what this difference is must remain
conjectural for the present.
What we are suggesting is that Bacon, unknowingly, used a
robust system based on an inherited concept and violated it to
produce his shock. That we do not become readily adapted to
such violations, although we become adapted to violations of
human artifacts, perhaps accounts for the enduring shock effect
that Bacon’s work, almost all of which violates faces and bodies,
has.
There are of course many other aspects of Bacon’s work that
we could discuss, but this would enter too much into a world of
speculation. While it is clear that different categories of animals
elicit a reaction from the visual brain, the effect of deformation of
animal faces and bodies on brain activity has not been studied in
any detail. But it is probably safe to assume that deformation of
animals has a similar effect—though possibly a less pronounced
one—than deformation of human faces and bodies. Bacon com-
monly painted animals and in some of his paintings he combined
a human body with an animal face, or vice versa, or incorporated
some elements of an animal into the depiction of a human.
CONCLUSION
What then are the insights of neurobiological and neuroesthet-
ics interest that Bacon’s paintings provide, as material for future
experiments?
We have based much of our argument on essential config-
urations that allow us to classify a stimulus as that of a face
or a body, a theoretical construct that may yet lead to impor-
tant experiments and insights. We have used previous results to
show that distortions of that essential configuration results in a
pattern of activation that is consistently different from the one
obtained when viewing configurations that satisfy the template
of what constitutes face or a body. We have argued that such
departures can have consequences. One of these, which Bacon
exploited, is that viewing configurations that depart from the
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essential configurations has, as a correlate, a strong activation of
sub-cortical structures such as the amygdala and the insula, an
effect that can be produced even when subjects are “unaware” of
the stimulus; moreover, departures are resistant to adaptation, in
that continual exposure does not diminish the response obtained
from the DLPFC and parietal cortex, as repeated exposure to
unusual human artifacts apparently does.
This raises a host of interesting questions. The first among
them is related to the representation of faces, bodies and objects
in the brain. Whether they are represented in discrete groupings
within a larger cortical area or whether each of these categories
is separately represented, Bacon’s paintings raise the question of
a separate and privileged access to the brain’s emotional systems
from the representation of faces and bodies compared to ordinary
man-made objects. If so, it is likely that groupings or modules
representing faces and bodies have different connections with
the brain’s emotional system, through routes that remain to be
determined. Equally interesting in this context is that the repre-
sentation of faces and bodies appears to be much more robust,
which implies that there is less room for experience to modify
that representation in the way that representation of human arti-
facts can be modified, a suggestion supported by the experiments
of Chen and Zeki (2011). This implies that the connections of
the latter are much more plastic than those of the former, making
it interesting to uncover the different mechanisms that regulate
plasticity in these different representations. This is also likely to be
reflected in the mechanisms regulating the formation of concepts
for different attributes. The enduring shock element in Bacon’s
paintings, even after repeated viewing, speaks in favor of a pro-
nounced resistance to modifying the concept of a face or a body;
by contrast, concepts of human artifacts are much more mod-
ifiable and less resistant to change. Hence, it follows that the
determinants of concept formation are much less plastic for faces
and bodies, the brain apparently not tolerating departures from a
primitive significant configuration for them.
Next comes the question of routing of visual signals to and
from a given area of the brain. It is important to realize that
faces and bodies, whether ugly, neutral or beautiful, are processed
through common structures—the OFA, the FFA and other areas
detailed above. At some point in these pathways, a neural deci-
sion must be taken to forward the results of the processing to
one part of the emotional brain or another. This raises the ques-
tion “at what level, in the face and body processing pathways, is
the routing of signals to one of the destinations made?” a ques-
tion that applies equally to beautiful and ugly faces. It is also
interesting to learn when and how signals are not routed to the
emotional centers or routed to them without eliciting a strong
and detectable response, as happens with neutral faces. This of
course amounts to a neurobiological question of general inter-
est, for all cortical areas have multiple inputs and outputs and
whether all the outputs from an area are active when the area
undertakes an operation or whether they are active only when the
area undertakes a particular operation is an important question
to address (Zeki, 1993). In our context, this can be more precisely
formulated by asking whether departures in significant configura-
tion in one direction activate certain outputs from the area while
departures in the other direction activate other pathways.
This also raises the question of what constitutes, in terms of
responses from a given area, say the FFA, a departure from an
essential configuration, i.e., does it lead to an increase or decrease
in firing of cells in the area or does it lead to a different pattern of
active cells. In theory at least, it should be possible to study this by
using imaging techniques that can determine whether the pattern
of activity in a given area differs according to departures from the
essential configuration.
Hence, Bacon’s work raises a host of interesting and important
problems, not only in the somewhat specific domain of the neural
mechanisms regulating face and body perception but the more
general neurobiological problem of what it is that determines the
routing of signals to one destination or another, given that each
area has multiple outputs.
REFERENCES
Archimbaud, M. (1992). Francis Bacon Entretiens avec Michel Archimbaud. Paris:
Jean-Claude Lattès.
Ariel, R., and Sadeh, M. (1996). Congenital visual agnosia and prosopagnosia in a
child: a case report. Cortex 32, 221–240. doi: 10.1016/S0010-9452(96)80048-7
Assal, G., Favre, C., and Anderes, J. P. (1984). Non-recognition of familiar animals
by a farmer. Zooagnosia or prosopagnosia for animals. Rev. Neurol. (Paris) 140,
580–584.
Bragg, M. (1985). The South Bank Show, London Weekend Television.
Available online at: http://www.virtual-circuit.org/word/conversation/Bacon/
Bacon/BaconDocumentary.html (Accessed July 11, 2013).
Bertini, C., Cecere, R., and Ladavas, E. (2013). I am blind, but I “see” fear. Cortex
49, 985–993. doi: 10.1016/j.cortex.2012.02.006
Bilalic, M., Langner, R., Ulrich, R., and Grodd, W. (2011). Many faces of expertise:
fusiform face area in chess experts and novices. J. Neurosci. 31, 10206–102014
doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.5727-10.2011
Botez, M. I., and Sebrãnescu, T. (1967). Course and outcome of visual static
agnosia. J. Neurol. Sci. 4, 289–297 doi: 10.1016/0022-510X(67)90107-4
Boutsen, L., Humphreys, G. W., Praamstra, P., and Warbrick, T. (2006).
Comparing neural correlates of configural processing in faces and objects:
an ERP study of the Thatcher illusion. Neuroimage 32, 352–367. doi:
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2006.03.023
Brighton, A. (2001). Francis Bacon. London: Tate Publishing Ltd.
Cassia, V. M., Valenza, E., Simion, F., and Leo, I. (2008). Congruency as a nonspe-
cific perceptual property contributing to newborns’ face preference. Child Dev.
79, 807–820. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8624.2008.01160.x
Chen, C. H., and Zeki, S. (2011). Frontoparietal activation distinguishes face
and space from artifact concepts. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 23, 2558–2568. doi:
10.1162/jocn.2011.21617
Cork, R. (1985). A Man Without Illusions, BBC Archives. Available online
at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/archive/bacon/5414.shtml (Accessed September 27,
2013).
Damasio, A. R., Damasio, H., and Van Hoesen, G. W. (1982). Prosopagnosia:
anatomic basis and behavioral mechanisms. Neurology 32, 331–341. doi:
10.1212/WNL.32.4.331
de Gelder, B. (2006). Towards the neurobiology of emotional body language. Nat.
Rev. Neurosci. 7, 242–249. doi: 10.1038/nrn1872
de Gelder, B., and Rouw, R. (2000). Paradoxical configuration effects for faces and
objects in prosopagnosia. Neuropsychologia 38, 1271–1279. doi: 10.1016/S0028-
3932(00)00039-7
de Gelder, B., Morris, J. S., and Dolan, R. J. (2005). Unconscious fear influences
emotional awareness of faces and voices. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 102,
18682–18687. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0509179102
de Heering, A., Wallis, J., andMaurer, D. (2012). The composite-face effect survives
asymmetric face distortions. Perception 41, 707–716. doi: 10.1068/p7212
Easy Art. Study for Portrait (1971). Available online at: http://www.easyart.com/
art-prints/Francis-Bacon/Study-for-Portrait-1971-15933.html (Accessed July
4, 2013).
Fletcher, P. C., Anderson, J.M., Shanks, D. R., Honey, R., Carpenter, T. A., Donovan,
T., et al. (2001). Responses of human frontal cortex to surprising events are
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org December 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 850 | 13
Zeki and Ishizu The “Visual Shock” of Francis Bacon
predicted by formal associative learning theory. Nat. Neurosci. 4, 1043–1048.
doi: 10.1038/nn733
Gauthier, I., and Nelson, C. A. (2001). The development of face expertise. Curr.
Opin. Neurobiol. 11, 219–224. doi: 10.1016/S0959-4388(00)00200-2
Gliga, T., and Dehaene-Lambertz, G. (2005). Structural encoding of body and
face in human infants and adults. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 17, 1328–1340. doi:
10.1162/0898929055002481
Goren, C. C., Sarty, M., and Wu, P. Y. K. (1975). Visual following and pat-
tern discrimination of face like stimuli by newborn infants. Paediatrics 56,
544–549.
Grill-Spector, K., Kourtzi, Z., and Kanwisher, N. (2001). The lateral occipital
complex and its role in object recognition. Vis. Res. 41, 1409–1422. doi:
10.1016/S0042-6989(01)00073-6
Grossberg, S. (1991). Why do parallel cortical systems exist for the percep-
tion of static form and moving form? Percept. Psychophys. 49, 117–141. doi:
10.3758/BF03205033
Hadjikhani, N., and de Gelder, B. (2003). Seeing fearful body expressions acti-
vates the fusiform cortex and amygdala. Curr. Biol. 13, 2201–2205. doi:
10.1016/j.cub.2003.11.049
Haxby, J., Hoffman, E., and Gobbini, M. (2000). The distributed human neural
system for face perception. Trends Cogn. Sci. 4, 223–233. doi: 10.1016/S1364-
6613(00)01482-0
Haxby, J. V., Gobbini, M. I., Furey, M. L., Ishai, A., Schouten, J. L., and Pietrini,
P. (2001). Distributed and overlapping representations of faces and objects
in ventral temporal cortex. Science 293, 2425–2430. doi: 10.1126/science.
1063736
Haxby, J. V., Ungerleider, L. G., Clark, V. P., Schouten, J. L., Hoffman, E. A., and
Martin, A. (1999). The effect of face inversion on activity in human neural
systems for face and object perception.Neuron 22, 189–199. doi: 10.1016/S0896-
6273(00)80690-X
Hiraoka, K., Suzuki, K., Hirayama, K., and Mori, E. (2009). Visual agnosia for line
drawings and silhouettes without apparent impairment of real-object recog-
nition: a case report. Behav. Neurol. 21, 187–192. doi: 10.3233/BEN-2009-
0244
Hubel, D. H., and Wiesel, T. N. (1977). Ferrier lecture. Functional architec-
ture of macaque monkey visual cortex. Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B 198, 1–59. doi:
10.1098/rspb.1977.0085
Humphreys, G. W., and Riddoch, M. J. (1987). To See But Not to See: A Case Study
of Visual Agnosia. London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Hung, Y., Smith, M. L., Bayle, D. J., Mills, T., Cheyne, D., and Taylor,
M. J. (2010). Unattended emotional faces elicit early lateralized
amygdala-frontal and fusiform activations. Neuroimage 50, 727–733. doi:
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2009.12.093
Ishai, A., Schmidt, C. F., and Boesiger, P. (2005). Face perception is medi-
ated by a distributed cortical network. Brain Res. Bull. 67, 87–93. doi:
10.1016/j.brainresbull.2005.05.027
Ishizu, T., Amemiya, K., Yumoto, M., and Kojima, S. (2010).
Magnetoencephalographic study of the neural responses in body perception.
Neurosci. Lett. 481, 31–40. doi: 10.1016/j.neulet.2010.06.047
Ishizu, T., Ayabe, T., and Kojima, S. (2008). Configurational factors in the percep-
tion of faces and non-facial objects: an ERP study. Int. J. Neurosci. 118, 955–966.
doi: 10.1080/00207450701769398
Jebb, J. (1965). Interview with Francis Bacon, BBC Archives, Available online
at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/archive/bacon/5400.shtml (Accessed September 27,
2013).
Johnson, M. H. (2005). Sub-cortical face processing.Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 6, 766–774.
doi: 10.1038/nrn1766
Johnson, M. H., Dziurawiec, S., Ellis, H., and Morton, J. (1991). Newborns’ pref-
erential tracking of face-like stimuli and its subsequent decline. Cognition 40,
1–19. doi: 10.1016/0010-0277(91)90045-6
Jones, J. (2012). Francis Bacon was a Shock Merchant, not a Nazi. Available
online at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/artanddesign/jonathanjonesblog/2012/
sep/04/francis-bacon-shock-merchant-nazi (Accessed July 13, 2013).
Kanwisher, N., McDermott, J., and Chun, M. M. (1997). The fusiform face area: a
module in human extrastriate cortex specialized for face perception. J. Neurosci.
17, 4302–4311.
Kanwisher, N., and Yovel, G. (2006). The fusiform face area: a cortical region spe-
cialized for the perception of faces. Philos. T. Roy. Soc. B 361, 2109–2128. doi:
10.1098/rstb.2006.1934
Kimchi, R., Behrmann, M., Avidan, G., and Amishav, R. (2012). Perceptual separa-
bility of featural and configural information in congenital prosopagnosia. Cogn.
Neuropsych. 29, 447–463. doi: 10.1080/02643294.2012.752723
Krolak-Salmon, P., Hénaff, M.-A., Isnard, J., Tallon-Baudry, C., Guénot, M.,
Vighetto, A., et al. (2003). An attentionmodulated response to disgust in human
ventral anterior insula. Ann. Neurol. 53, 446–453. doi: 10.1002/ana.10502
Krolak-Salmon, P., Henaff, M. A., Vighetto, A., Bertrand, O., and Mauguiere, F.
(2004). Early amygdala reaction to fear spreading to occipital, temporal, and
frontal cortex: a depth electrode ERP study in human. Neuron 42, 665–676. doi:
10.1016/S0896-6273(04)00264-8
Logothetis, N. K., Pauls, J. and Poggio, T. (1995). Shape representation in the
inferior temporal cortex of monkeys.Curr. Biol. 5, 552–563. doi: 10.1016/S0960-
9822(95)00108-4
Maguire, E. A., Frith, C. D., and Cipolotti, L. (2001). Distinct neural systems for the
encoding and recognition of topography and faces. Neuroimage 13, 743–750.
doi: 10.1006/nimg.2000.0712
Maratos, F. A., Mogg, K., and Bradley, B. P. (2009). Coarse threat images reveal
theta oscillations in the amygdala: a magnetoencephalography study. Cogn. Aff.
Behav. Neurosci. 9, 133–143. doi: 10.3758/CABN.9.2.133
McConachie, H. R. (1976). Developmental prosopagnosia. A single case report.
Cortex 12, 76–82. doi: 10.1016/S0010-9452(76)80033-0
Minnebusch, D. A., Suchan, B., and Daum, I. (2008). Losing your head: behav-
ioral and electrophysiological effects of body inversion. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 21,
865–874. doi: 10.1162/jocn.2009.21074
Morris, J. S., Frith, C. D., Perrett, D. I., Rowland, D., Young, A. W., Calder, A. J.,
et al. (1996). A differential neural response in the human amygdala to fearful
and happy facial expressions. Nature 383, 812–815. doi: 10.1038/383812a0
Moscovitch, M., Wincour, G., and Behrmann, M. (1997). What is special about
face recognition? Nineteen experiments on a person with visual object agnosia
and dyslexia but normal face recognition. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 9, 555–604. doi:
10.1162/jocn.1997.9.5.555
Pallis, C. A. (1955). Impaired identification of faces and places with agnosia for
colours. J. Neurol. Neurosurg. Psychiat. 18, 218–224. doi: 10.1136/jnnp.18.3.218
Peelen, M. V., and Downing, P. E. (2007). The neural basis of visual body percep-
tion. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 8, 636–648. doi: 10.1038/nrn2195
Peppiatt, M. (1996). Francis Bacon: Anatomy of an Enigma. London: Weidenfield
and Nicholson.
Pitcher, D., Walsh, V., and Duchaine, B. (2011). The role of the occipital face
area in the cortical face perception network. Exp. Brain Res. 209, 481–493. doi:
10.1007/s00221-011-2579-1
Pitcher, D., Walsh, V., Yovel, G., and Duchaine, B. (2007). TMS evidence for the
involvement of the right occipital face area in early face processing. Curr. Biol.
17, 1568–1573. doi: 10.1016/j.cub.2007.07.063
Pourtois, G., Schwartz, S., Seghier, M. L., Lazeyras, F., and Vuilleumier, P. (2005).
Portraits or people? Distinct representations of face identity in the human visual
cortex. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 17, 1043–1057. doi: 10.1162/0898929054475181
Raichle, M. E., Fiez, J. A., Videen, T. O., MacLeod, A. M., Pardo, J. V., Fox, P.
T., et al. (1994). Practice-related changes in human brain functional anatomy
during nonmotor learning. Cereb. Cortex 4, 8–26. doi: 10.1093/cercor/4.1.8
Rainer, G., and Miller, E. K. (2000). Effects of visual experience on the rep-
resentation of objects in the prefrontal cortex. Neuron 27, 179–189. doi:
10.1016/S0896-6273(00)00019-2
Reed, C. L., Stone, V. E., Bozova, S., and Tanaka, J. (2003). The body-inversion
effect. Psychol. Sci. 14, 302–308. doi: 10.1111/1467-9280.14431
Reynolds, N. (2007). Francis Bacon Painting Pays for RCA Campus.
Available online at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1562091/
Francis-Bacon-painting-pays-for-RCA-campus.html (Accessed July 6, 2013).
Sato, W., Kochiyama, T., Uono, S., Matsuda, K., Usui, K., Inoue, Y., et al. (2011).
Rapid amygdala gamma oscillations in response to fearful facial expressions.
Neuropsychologia 49, 612–617. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2010.12.025
Schwarzlose, R. F., Baker, C. I., and Kanwisher, N. (2005). Separate face and
body selectivity on the fusiform gyrus. J. Neurosci. 25, 11055–11059. doi:
10.1523/JNEUROSCI.2621-05.2005
Sergent, J., Otha, S., and MacDonald, B. (1992). Functional neuroanatomy of
face and object processing - a positron emission tomography study. Brain 115,
15–36. doi: 10.1093/brain/115.1.15
Simion, F., Valenza, E., Cassia, V. M., Turati, C., and Umilta, C. (2002). Newborns’
preference for up-down asymmetrical configurations. Dev. Sci. 5, 427–434. doi:
10.1111/1467-7687.00237
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org December 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 850 | 14
Zeki and Ishizu The “Visual Shock” of Francis Bacon
Stekelenburg, J. J., and de Gelder, B. (2004). The neural correlates of perceiving
human bodies: an ERP study on the body-inversion effect. Neuroreport 15,
777–780. doi: 10.1097/00001756-200404090-00007
Sylvester, D. (1963). Interview with Francis Bacon. (BBC Archives). Available online
at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/archive/bacon/5412.shtml (Accessed July 8, 2013).
Tate. (2013a). Three Studies for Figures at the Base of a Crucifixion. Available online
at: http://www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/bacon-three-studies-for-figures-at-the-
base-of-a-crucifixion-n06171(Accessed July 6, 2013).
Tate. (2013b). Francis Bacon Second Version of Triptych 1944. Available online at:
http://www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/bacon-second-version-of-triptych-1944-t0
5858 (Accessed July 6, 2013).
Thatcher, M. (1992). Quoted in the New York Times obituary of Francis Bacon,
April 1992. Available online at: http://www.nytimes.com/1992/04/29/arts/
francis-bacon-82-artist-of-the-macabre-dies.html (Accessed July 16, 2013).
Thierry, G., Pegna, A. J., Dodds, C., Roberts, M., Basan, S., and Downing, P. (2006).
An event-related potential component sensitive to images of the human body.
Neuroimage 32: 871–879. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2006.03.060
Thompson, P. (1980). Margaret Thatcher: a new illusion. Perception. 9, 483–484.
doi: 10.1068/p090483
Time (magazine). (1953). Art: Snapshots from Hell. Available online at: http://www.
time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,823081,00.html (Accessed July 2013).
Vuilleumier, P., Armony, J. L., Driver, J., and Dolan, R. J. (2003). Distinct spa-
tial frequency sensitivities for processing faces and emotional expressions. Nat.
Neurosci. 6, 624–631. doi: 10.1038/nn1057
Zeki, S. (2008). Splendors and Miseries of the Brain: Love, Creativity and the Quest
for Human Happiness.Wiley-Blackwell.
Zeki, S. and Marini, L. (1998). Three cortical stages of colour process-
ing in the human brain. Brain 121, 1669–1685. doi: 10.1093/brain/121.
9.1669
Zeki, S. (1993). A Vision of The Brain. Oxford: Blackwell Scientific.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was con-
ducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be
construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Received: 10 September 2013; accepted: 21 November 2013; published online: 10
December 2013.
Citation: Zeki S and Ishizu T (2013) The “Visual Shock” of Francis Bacon: an essay in
neuroesthetics. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 7:850. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00850
This article was submitted to the journal Frontiers in Human Neuroscience.
Copyright © 2013 Zeki and Ishizu. This is an open-access article distributed under the
terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or
reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor
are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with
accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which
does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org December 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 850 | 15
